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STATEMENT OF 
a) Nature of the Case 
This is a direct appeal by the Defendant in a criminal case from a conviction and sentence 
under Idaho Code§ 18-2601: Falsifying Evidence by Offering Forged or Fraudulent Documents 
into Evidence. The case presents questions of the admissibility of evidence offered by the State; 
in particular, the testimony regarding a prior stalking charge and the admission of the 
purportedly forged letters themselves into evidence without proper foundation. 
b) Course of Proceedings 
A Complaint was filed with Ada County Court on February 13, 2012, charging Phillip 
Ruggiero with three counts of Offering False or Forged Instrument for Record under Idaho Code 
§ 18-3203. Clerk's Record, p. 3. On April 13, 2012, the charges were amended to three counts of 
Falsifying Evidence by Offering Forged or Fraudulent Documents in Evidence under LC. § 18-
2601 and a Preliminary Hearing was held. Id. On April 30, 2012, the Defendant entered a plea of 
Not Guilty to the charges. Id. at 4. On June 4, 2012, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
case for a lack of probable cause, alleging there was not substantial evidence presented at the 
Preliminary Hearing that the Defendant committed the crime for which he has been held to 
answer. Id. After subsequent hearings on the Motion to Dismiss, the Honorable Judge Deborah 
Bail of the District Court of Idaho for the Fourth Judicial District granted the Motion to Dismiss. 
Id. at 5. After the case was dismissed on July 16, 2012, the State appealed the dismissal to the 
Idaho Supreme Court. Id. On August 27, 2014, the Supreme Court reversed and remitted the case 
for further proceedings. Id. 
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on June 15, the Defendant made a Motion 
irrelevant testimony regarding a prior charge from being offered into evidence. Jury Trial 
Transcript, p. 99, 11. 20-25. Further objections were made when letters supposedly written by the 
Defendant were admitted into evidence without proper authentication. Id. at p. 99, 11. 20-25; p. 
133, 11. 1-3, p. 169, 11. 17-19. At the conclusion of the two-day trial, the Defendant was found 
guilty under I 18-2601. The Appellant now appeals from that decision. 
c) Statement of Facts 
On September 29, 2011, October 12, 2011, and October 18, 2011, the Ada County 
Courthouse received letters addressed to the Honorable Judge Thomas Watkins. See Jury Trial 
Transcript, p. 24, 11 3-25. The three letters were assumed to be written by Mr. Ruggiero between 
the months of September and October. Id. Each of the letters referenced the case number to a 
prior proceeding and requested in some manner that the criminal charges be dropped. Id. One 
letter was signed via typewritter, "Lisa Roggenbuck", one "Spearmint Rhino Bouncer," and the 
third "Jenn Higginson." Id. at 24-26. The State sought to prove the current violation, which 
states, "Every person who, upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry or investigation ... offers in 
evidence as genuine or true, any ... instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been 
forged .. .is guilty of a felony." LC. § 18-2601. In order to prove that the letters in question were 
offered upon an official proceeding, the State introduced details of the previous case, where the 
Defendant had been charged by the City of Boise with stalking, although he plead guilty to the 
amended charge of Disturbing the Peace on November 17, 2011. See Jury Trial Transcript, p. 
105, 11. 8-23. 
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the day negotiations regarding the amendment during a 
Pretrial Conference, Judge Watkins, who was the assigned judge on the stalking case, alerted the 
prosecutor, Christine Starr that he had received three letters regarding the matter at hand. See 
PSI, pp. 61-63. Even though the Prosecutor suspected the letters were fraudulent, she still agreed 
to reduce the stalking charge to disturbing the peace. Id. Ms. Starr then forwarded the letters to 
the Ada County Prosecutor's office. Id. 
Mr. Ruggiero was subsequently charged with the three violations and the case went to 
Jury Trial. During the trial, Christine Starr, the prosecutor on the stalking case, Judge Thomas 
Watkins, the judge on the stalking case, and Lisa Roggenbuck, the alleged victim in the stalking 
case, each testified and not only named the prior offense, but also gave extensive details 
regarding the facts surrounding the past misconduct. See Jury Trial Transcript, p. 118, 11. 13-14; 
Id. at p. 136, 11. 7-9; See, e.g. Jury Trial Transcript, p. 170, 11. 5-22. For example, during trial, Ms. 
Starr testified that the case she prosecuted in the past was, "a stalking in the second degree case." 
Jury Trial Transcript, p. 118, 11. 13-14. She then proceeded to give even more detail when she 
stated, "I absolutely had concerns because I had met with Lisa, and I was very clear about how 
she felt at the time we met, and her fears and her position." Id. at p. 122, 11. 18-22. 
Afterward, the prosecution called Judge Watkins to the stand. Id. at p. 134, 11. 17-20. 
Again, the stalking charge was named when he stated, "It was a criminal case. I believe the 
original charge was second degree stalking, which is a misdemeanor." Id. at p. 136, 11. 7-9. He 
later detailed for the jury, "I mean, the underlying case had to do with a gentlemen's club, 
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course of that. It was a little Springer-ish, a out 
of the ordinary that way." Id. at p.141, 11. 1-4. 
Lisa Roggenbuck took the stand next. Id. at p.167, 11. 3-6. She, too, provided the jury with 
inflammatory testimony regarding the prior stalking offense. See e.g., Jury Trial Transcript, pp. 
168-170. She detailed that Mr. Ruggiero's conduct toward her changed "quite quickly" and 
claimed, "[h]e started to think that we had a relationship together, and to think that we were 
going to get married." Id. at p. 170, 11. 12-14. The testimony continued with, "[I filed a police 
report] on the day that he told me he had my license plate memorized, which he recited to me, 
described the clothes that I was wearing." Id, at p. 170, 11. 19-22. Despite constant objections 
from Mr. Ruggiero and an offer to stipulate to the fact that a prior proceeding existed, testimony 
similar to this continued throughout the trial. See Jury Trial Transcript, p. 99, 11. 20-25; p. 133, 11. 
1-3, p. 169, 11. 17-19; p. 170, 11. 23-25 (objecting for prejudicial effect and offering to stipulate). 
This is an appeal from the admission of prejudicial testimony into evidence without any 
balancing test having been conducted to weigh the probative value, despite renewed objections 
from the Defendant. It is also an appeal from the admission of the letters themselves into 
evidence without prior foundation at jury trial. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court err in allowing witnesses for the prosecution to testify regarding 
past charges without performing the required balancing test to determine relevance 
and prejudicial effect? 
II. Did the trial court err in admitting letters into evidence without authentication to 
support a finding that the letters are what the state claimed them to be? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An appeal regarding the admissibility of evidence uses a mixed standard of review. State 
v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008). First, whether the evidence is relevant 
is a matter of law that is reviewed de nova. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 762, 864 P.2d 
596, 600 (1993). Second, the requirement that the court address whether the probative value of 
the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Stevens, 146 
Idaho at 143, 191 P.3d at 221. A trial court's determination that evidence is supported by a 
proper foundation or authentication is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 634, 977 P.2d 890, 896 (l 999)(explaining that appellate courts review 
trial court decisions admitting or excluding evidence under the abuse of discretion standard). 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court improperly admitted witness testimony regarding a prior stalking 
charge because the admission of such evidence unduly prejudiced Mr. Ruggiero. Not only was 
such testimony irrelevant, but any probative value to the prosecution was outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect. Further, the trial court abused its discretion when it completely failed to 
conduct the I.R.E. 403 balancing test before choosing to admit or exclude the testimony. 
Additionally, the trial court erred in admitting letters into evidence over the 
objection by Mr. Ruggiero that there was no proper foundation laid for authentication. This 
improper admission violated I.R.E. 90l(a). 
I. Admitting detailed testimony regarding Mr. Ruggiero's past stalking charge 
violated the applicable legal standards required by I.RE. 404(b ). 
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court admitting thorough and persistent testimony a prior charge, 
even though the name and nature of the past offense created a risk of a verdict influenced by 
prejudicial considerations. 
The Rules of Evidence typically govern the admission of all evidence in the courts of 
Idaho. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010)(quoting State v. Meister, 148 
Idaho 236, 240, 220 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2009))(emphasis in original). I.R.E. 404(b) provides that 
"[ e ]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove character of a person in 
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith." I.RE. 404(b). Prior conviction 
evidence, in particular, often brings a uniquely significant danger of unfair prejudice toward a 
Defendant. Old Chief v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 644, 654, 519 U.S. 172, 188 (1997). This 
danger is heightened when a Defendant is willing to stipulate or admit to a record of conviction. 
Id at 655, 519 U.S. at 191. When determining the admissibility of evidence when an I.R.E. 
404(b) objection has been made, the trial court must conduct a balancing test to consider (1) 
whether the past acts are relevant to a material and disputed issue in the case and (2) whether the 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Grist, 14 7 
Idaho 49, 52, 205 P .3d 1185, 1188 (2009). Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, "evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury." I.R.E. 403. Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court has routinely 
held that the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence without conducting Rule 403 's 
analysis is an abuse of discretion. Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471, 248 P.3d at 722. See also Grist, 147 
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at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188; State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 956, 964 (2003). 
Evidence of the prior stalking charge was inadmissible for the foregoing reasons. 
A. The testimony regarding prior stalking charges was not admissible because it was not 
relevant as it pertains to the charged offense. 
Evidence of a Defendant's previous misconduct is inadmissible unless it is relevant to 
the charged offense. State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 9, 304 P.3d 276, 284 (2013). Evidence is relevant 
only if it has the tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the admission of the evidence. 
I.R.E. 401; State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008). Thus, under I.R.E. 
404(b), evidence of prior misconduct may only be admitted if "relevant to prove ... a common 
scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that 
proof of one tends to establish the other, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 
State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668, 227 P .3d 918, 922 (2010) ( emphasis in original) ( quoting 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55, 205 P.3d at 1190-91). This means that evidence of prior misconduct 
must show that it is so strongly linked to the charged conduct that it permits the inference that the 
past misconduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the current offense. 
Joy, 155 Idaho at 10, 304 P.3d at 285. 
The likelihood of prior misconduct being deemed relevant may be lessened when the 
alleged prior misconduct does not result in a conviction and does not demonstrate more than 
mere similarity to the case at hand. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 51,205 P.3d at 1187. For example, in 
State v. Pokorney, when determining the relevance of evidence regarding a prior bad act, the 
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court stated that before testimony could be admitted, must be sufficient to 
establish the prior bad acts as fact. 149 Idaho 459, 462, 235 P.3d 409, 412 (Ct. App. 
2010)( emphasis added). Similarly, in Grist, the Court reasoned that evidence of uncharged 
misconduct is only relevant if the jury is able to adequately conclude that the act occurred and 
that the defendant was the actor. 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. In that case, the Court held 
that testimony offered regarding the Defendant's prior, uncharged sexual misconduct with a 
minor needed to be more heavily scrutinized for admissibility and that there must be limits to the 
use of prior misconduct evidence. Id. at 53,205 P.3d at 1189. In State v. Fisher, the Court held 
that evidence regarding the Defendant's physical abuse of his current stepchildren was not 
relevant in proving that the Defendant committed the charged act of child molestation. 165 
Wash. 2d 727, 750, 202 P.3d 937, 949 (2009). The Court in that case reasoned that since the 
Defendant was not charged with physical abuse, such evidence robbed the Defendant of his right 
to a fair trial. Id. at 756, 202 P.3d at 952. 
Courts have also found that providing evidence of a pnor conviction when an 
admission to that conviction was available or offered is an abuse of discretion. Old Chief, 117 
S.Ct. at 655, 519 U.S. at 191. In Old Chief, the Court held that it was an abuse of discretion to 
admit record of a prior judgment, when the name and nature of that charge created the risk of a 
judgment "tainted by improper considerations." Id. at 647, 519 U.S. at 174. In that case, the 
Comi allowed full record of a prior assault conviction to be admitted, over renewed objection, in 
order to prove felony status for a gun charge. Id. at 648, 519 U.S. at 177. The Court reasoned that 
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willingness to stipulate to fact that was a conviction 
removed the necessity to name and give details of the prior offense. Id. at 653,519 U.S. at 186. 
The trial court's decision to allow testimony of Mr. Ruggiero's past misconduct into 
evidence violated the Idaho Rules of Evidence, since testimony regarding a prior stalking charge 
is not relevant to the currently charged offense. Just like the prior misconduct in Pokorney, the 
prosecution failed to establish the past stalking charge as fact. Not only was the prior stalking 
charge reduced to disturbing the peace, but also, a stalking charge does not bear any similarity to 
the case at hand. Like the Court reasoned in Grist, a higher level of scrutiny should be required 
prior to admitting testimony of an uncharged offense. The prior misconduct in our case is similar 
to an uncharged offense, since Mr. Ruggiero was never convicted of stalking, but only convicted 
of disturbing the peace. Further, the court in our case failed to scrutinize the admissibility of such 
testimony at all, despite several objections on behalf of Mr. Ruggiero. In Fisher, the court felt 
that evidence of prior physical abuse was irrelevant to help prove child molestation, since the 
Defendant was not being charged with physical abuse. Similarly, in our case, Mr. Ruggiero was 
not being charged with stalking; thus, admitting constant testimony, including details, was much 
like retrying a case that had already been settled. The evidence offered was irrelevant to prove 
the current charge of offering false instrument for record. 
Further, the Court erred by admitting evidence of the past stalking charge, since Mr. 
Ruggiero repeatedly offered to stipulate to the fact that there existed a past proceeding; which 
was an element the prosecution needed to prove. Our case is most analogous to Old Chief; with 
respect to the offer to stipulate or admit a necessary element of the prosecution's case. If the 
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name and details of a assault charge were found to cause improper considerations with 
respect to the jury in an illegal weapon case, so should the name and nature of a charge as 
sensitive as stalking, offered to prove false instrument for record. Just like naming an assault 
charge despite a willingness to stipulate to a prior felony, allowing a prior stalking charge to be 
named deprived Mr. Ruggiero of an impartial jury. Naming the prior charge, exacerbated by 
constant details about the past misconduct, no doubt lacked relevance to the case at hand. 
Accordingly, the testimony of the past stalking charge was irrelevant and should not have been 
allowed into evidence. 
B. Even if the testimony regarding past charges was relevant, its prejudicial effect 
outweighed any probative value. 
Allowing detailed testimony about a prior conviction has the potential to lure the jury 
into declaring fault on grounds unrelated to the matter at hand. E.g., Robinson v. Taylor, 356 
P.3d 1230, 1238 (Utah 2015). Further, although evidence might be relevant, it must be excluded 
if the trial court erroneously balanced the probative value against the prejudicial effect, resulting 
in a great danger that the jury may believe prior misconduct demonstrates deviant character 
traits. Pokorney, 149 Idaho at 466, 235 P.3d at 416. For example, in Pokorney, the Court held 
that although witness testimony and a letter written by the Defendant were relevant evidence of a 
prior bad act and showed consciousness of guilt; the unfair prejudice to the Defendant 
substantially outweighed the probative value. Id. Both pieces of evidence highly favored the 
prosecution and went into great detail regarding the Defendant's sexual proclivity, thus, both 
were admitted in error, despite objections from the Defendant. Id. 
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Also, Old Chief, the found that details, including the name and general 
character of a past crime ought not be disclosed when the fact of a qualifying conviction is all 
that is relevant. 117 S.Ct. at 655, 519 U.S. at 190. The Court in that case claimed that, "(t]he 
most the jury needs to know is that the conviction admitted by the defendant falls within the 
class of crimes" that qualify an individual as a felon possessing a gun. Id. at 655, 519 U.S. at 
190-191. The Court further stated, "[i]n this case, as in any other in which the prior conviction is 
for an offense likely to support conviction on some improper ground, the only reasonable 
conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the discounted 
probative value of the record of conviction." Id. 
The opposite was true in State v. Cardell, when testimony regarding the Defendant's 
prior sexual misconduct with his massage clients was deemed not so prejudicial as to outweigh 
the probative value. 132 Idaho 217, 220, 970 P.2d 10, 13 (1998). In that case, the Court reasoned 
that since the testimony was only allowed in during the State's rebuttal, after the defendant had 
testified that he had never touched any massage clients sexually, it was only offered to prove that 
the defendant performed the same therapy on all clients. Id. 
Providing the jury with the name and details of Mr. Ruggiero's past stalking charge 
unfairly prejudiced Mr. Ruggiero. As was the case in Pokorney, testimony was admitted in our 
case that can not be said to have been so informational that its prejudicial effect could be 
overlooked. While it is likely that many types of evidence pose a risk of unfair prejudice, here, as 
was the case in Pokorney, it is possible that the prejudicial effect was so great that the jury might 
have based its decision to convict Mr. Ruggiero on the imagery that the detailed testimony 
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extensive details of stalking the testimony in our case provided likely created a 
depiction that Mr. Ruggiero should be punished, regardless of his alleged accountability in this 
particular case. 
Additionally, no one can reasonably dispute that providing the jury with the name and 
nature of Mr. Ruggiero's previous stalking charges is not inherently prejudicial. While it can be 
said that the name and nature of prior misconduct might be relevant in a criminal proceeding, 
where there exists a significant risk that the jury will declare guilt based on prior misconduct, 
that evidence must be excluded, as it is unduly prejudicial. Just like the Court in Old Chief stated, 
in order to reduce the risk of unfair prejudice, the name and nature of a past crime ought not be 
disclosed when the details are irrelevant. As the fact of a qualifying conviction was all that was 
relevant in Old Chief, all that was relevant in our case was that there existed a past proceeding, or 
inquiry authorized by law. Despite Mr. Ruggiero's willingness to stipulate to this fact, just like 
the defendant in Old Chief, the Court allowed in several instances naming and/or providing 
details of the previous stalking case, resulting in an unfair prejudice. 
While in Cardell, testimony offered only after the Defendant claimed that he had 
never previously touched a client sexually was deemed not unfairly prejudicial; no such claims 
were made in our case. Here, the uninvited testimony was offered prior to any claims to the 
contrary and despite a willingness to stipulate to the only relevant information. Thus, it follows 
that unlike Cardell, the testimony in our case was so prejudicial that it did not outweigh its 
probative value. 
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The trial court erred by failing to conduct a Rule 403 analysis prior to admitting into 
evidence the testimony of witnesses regarding past stalking charges. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a trial court abuses its discretion when it fails 
to conduct the I.R.E. 403 balancing test prior to admitting or excluding evidence. State v. Parker, 
157 Idaho 132, 139, 334 P.3d 806, 813 (2014) (citing Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471, 248 P.3d at 721-
22). For instance, in Parker, the Court found that a trial court is required to address "whether the 
probative value is substantially outweighed by one of the considerations listed" in I.RE. 403. 
157 Idaho at 139, 334 P.3d at 813 (citing Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471, 248 P.3d at 722). Failure to do 
so is an abuse of discretion because the court has failed to act consistently within the applicable 
legal standards. Id. The same was true in Ruiz, when the trial court failed to fulfill its duty to 
weigh the probative value of evidence regarding minimum mandatory sentencing. 150 Idaho at 
471, 248 P.3d at 722. In that case, the Court recognized that the trial court abused its discretion 
by merely stating, "[y]ou can't talk about minimum mandatories." Id. Following the Defendant's 
objection, the trial court excluded the evidence without conducting the analysis required by 
I.RE. 403; thus, the Court held that the trial court erred and the judgment was vacated. Id. 
However, the opposite was true in State v. Ehrlick, when the Court held that the trial 
court correctly upheld their duty to weigh the probative value of the I.R.E. evidence against the 
danger of unfair prejudice for the Defendant. 158 Idaho 900, 915, 354 P.3d 462, 478 (2015). 
There, the trial court noted that past behavior, such as choking, hitting, and showing a lack of 
remorse for sadistic behavior was probative of the defendant's intent to inflict suffering, which 
was relevant in a murder charge. Id. at 915-916, 354 P.3d at 478-79. The Court further reasoned 
13 
court had engaged in "extensive discussion about the probative value of the 
evidence and whether it was unduly prejudicial. Id. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to conduct a balancing test to 
determine whether the evidence of Mr. Ruggiero's past stalking charge had a prejudicial effect 
that outweighed its probative value. As stated in Parker, once an objection has been made, the 
balancing test must be performed. No such test was performed in our case. Just like the court in 
Ruiz, which only made a statement in passing about the admissibility of testimony, in our case, 
upon objection to details about the prior charge, the court simply stated, "Well, because the 
nature of the charge is that there was preparation of false evidence for a proceeding, then it is 
relevant and admissible to discuss that there was a proceeding." Jury Trial Transcript, p. 169, 11. 
20-23. The court subsequently allowed the detailed testimony into evidence. 
Unlike the Court in Ehrlick, which engaged in extensive discussion regarding the 
admissibility of prior misconduct evidence, the Court in our case failed to probe further than 
simply stating that the evidence might be relevant, completely failing to balance the probative 
value against the prejudicial effect. Thus, it follows that the Court should hold that the trial court 
failed to perform its duty under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
II. Admitting unauthenticated letters into evidence violated I.R.E. 901(a), 
resulting in unfair prejudice to Mr. Ruggiero. 
The trial court erroneously admitted letters purportedly written by Mr. Ruggiero into 
evidence, since the letters had not been authenticated and lacked proper foundation. Idaho Rules 
of Evidence 90l(a) provides that the requirement of authentication or identification as a 
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precedent to admissibility can only be satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the evidence in question is what the proponent claims. State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 
814, 817, 186 P.3d 670, 673 (Ct. App. 2008). The rule provides a list of example methods 
sufficient to authenticate a document; however, authentication by circumstantial evidence is 
permissible, though courts have disagreed as to what circumstantial evidence is adequate. Id; See 
also State v. Silverson, 130 Idaho 283, 285, 939 P.2d 859, 861 (Ct. App. 1997). In Silverson, the 
court found that the State's methods of authenticating handwritten progress notes and physician 
invoices, offered to prove false claims for services not actually provided, did not satisfy any of 
the subparts of I.R.E. 901(b). 130 Idaho at 285, 939 P.2d at 861. In that case, the state presented 
testimony from its investigator that he recognized the Defendant's signature on the documents, 
but it failed to offer any evidence that the investigator's familiarity with the signature was 
acquired outside of litigation purposes. Id. However, since the documents were created under an 
official duty to maintain records of services, they could be authenticated under I.R.E. 901 (b )(7). 
Id. at 286, 939 P.2d at 862. 
Additionally, the court m Chacon held that the state offered convmcmg enough 
circumstantial evidence to substantiate the claim that a handwritten note was written by the 
defendant and was correctly allowed into evidence. 145 Idaho at 817, 186 P .3d at 673. In that 
case, the State's offer of proof included testimony from officers employed at the jail where the 
letter was allegedly written and passed to its intended recipient, a map demonstrating the layout 
of the jail, and an officer who read the note aloud to the court, stopping constantly to eliminate 
other possible authors of the note based on its contents. Id. 
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purportedly written by Mr. Ruggiero lacked proper foundation and were 
erroneously admitted into evidence. Unlike in Stiverson, the letters in our case did not contain a 
signature, nor were they created under an official duty to maintain records of service. Further, in 
Silverson, though it was deemed unsatisfactory, testimony had been offered to authenticate all 
documents in question. In our case, the only individual who was able to offer any sort of 
substantiation was Kristy Woody, who claimed she purchased perfume for Mr. Ruggiero to spray 
on one of the allegedly forged letters. She admitted to not having seen Mr. Ruggiero typing the 
letters or sending the letters, nor did she actually aid in spraying the letters. Additionally, Ms. 
Woody claims to only have actually even seen one out of three letters supposedly written by Mr. 
Ruggiero. 
In Chacon, letters were authenticated based on significant circumstantial evidence to 
substantiate the claim that they were written by the defendant in that case. In contrast, here very 
little evidence was offered and none was expert. For example, in our case, evidence offered to 
authenticate the letters as being written by Mr. Ruggiero included testimony from Lisa 
Roggenbuck stating she did not write one of the three letters, testimony from the prosecutor on 
the past stalking case, Christine Starr, claiming she "had a feeling" that Mr. Ruggiero wrote the 
letters, and the detective on the past stalking case, Angela Munson, claiming all three letters had 
similar qualities. Unlike in Chacon, no witnesses were able to go through the note and explain 
why they believed it to be written by Mr. Ruggiero. It follows that the Court should find that the 
state failed to offer convincing enough circumstantial evidence to substantiate the claim that the 
letters were actually written by Mr. Ruggiero and properly authenticated under I.R.E. 901. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ruggiero respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction or, in the alternative, reverse and remand the matter for a new trial. 
DATED this 5th day of August, 2016. 
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